This paper criticizes Soames's main argument against a variant of two-dimensionalism that he calls strong two-dimensionalism.
Introduction

Scott Soames's book Reference and Description. The Case Against Two-
Dimensionalism delivers the most thorough critique of two-dimensionalism to date. This paper focuses on Soames's Argument 1, which targets one specific variety of the theory, strong two-dimensionalism. 1 Argument 1 is of central importance to Soames's critique of strong two-dimensionalism, as it provides the basic structure for his further arguments. 2 Soames coins the term strong two-dimensionalism to refer to a variant of two-dimensionalism that is based on ideas found in Chalmers (1996) and Jackson (1998) . Argument 1 specifically targets the semantics for belief ascriptions associated with strong two-dimensionalism. This is quite surprising, since Soames acknowl- edges that an explicit semantics for belief ascriptions is put forward in neither of the two books. 3 Independently of whether Soames is correct in attributing strong two-dimensionalism to these two authors, the proposed strong twodimensionalist semantics of belief ascriptions deserves serious attention, since it is the most straight-forward implementation of such a semantics available to a two-dimensionalist. Soames specifies this part of the semantics in one of a number of core theses that together constitute his characterization of strong two-dimensionalism. The main argument of this paper is based on the observation that these core theses fail to determine a unique semantic treatment of claims about the truth of a belief that is ascribed to an individual. As it turns out, strong two-dimensionalists are left with a choice of two alternative formal semantics for such claims. I will argue that only one of the two renders strong two-dimensionalists vulnerable to Argument 1 and that the other options allows them to avoid the argument. 4
1 The argument is reproduced in Soames (2006) and, in a notational variant, in Soames (2005a) . 2 I agree with Dever concerning this point. See Dever (2007) , p. 9-10. 3 Soames finds Jackson to be ' [. . . ] less than fully explicit [. . . ] ' (Soames (2005b), p. 172) about the semantics of attitude ascriptions, but argues that he should be understood as implicitly endorsing the strong two-dimensionalist proposal (See Soames (2005b), pp. 173-5) . Concerning Chalmers, Soames admits that ' [. . . ] he has very little explicitly to say about the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions in The Conscious Mind.' (Soames (2005b) , p. 235). 4 A different perspective on Argument 1 has recently been offered in Dever (2007) . I largely agree with Dever's diagnosis of his more abstract reconstruction of Argument 1, but I also think that Soames's original formulation of the argument raises important issues concerning the two-dimensionalist treatment of belief ascriptions that are lost in Dever's reconstruction.
The main focus of this paper is on the formal semantics underlying strong twodimensionalism and on the claims made about such a semantics in the premises of Soames's Argument 1. As a consequence, many important philosophical questions about two-dimensionalism in general, e.g. the question of what it means that another world could have turned out as actual, will have to be left unanswered. The current section attempts to briefly introduce some fundamental concepts and philosophical motivations behind two-dimensionalism. As I see it, the two fundamental ideas of two-dimensional semantics are first, that each natural language expression is associated with two intensions, a primary and a secondary intension 5 , and second, that these two kinds of intensions can be defined as functions that take two different kinds of possible worlds as their arguments. If the focus is on sentences rather then on sub-sentential expressions, these two basic ideas can alternatively be framed in terms of primary and secondary propositions.
The secondary intension corresponds to the familiar intension from possi- One idea common to most variants of two-dimensionalism is that the primary intension captures an epistemic aspect of meaning and that secondary intensions capture an alethic, or metaphysical, aspect of meaning. This idea is also instrumental to the two-dimensionalist explanation of the necessary a posteriori: A sentence is necessary and a posteriori if and only if it has a contingent primary and a necessary secondary proposition. Similarly, a sentence is contingent and a priori if and only if it has a necessary primary and a contingent secondary proposition. This elegant semantic explanation is one of the biggest selling points of two-dimensionalism.
The Formal Apparatus
Syntax
The formal language used in this paper contains the following symbols:
A set of constants for atomic sentences P = {p, q, r, . . T r. 7 The sentences of the language are recursively built up according to the following rules:
Each φ ∈ P is a sentence.
If φ is a sentence and • ∈ U, •(φ) is a sentence.
If φ and ψ are sentences and • ∈ B, (φ • ψ) is a sentence.
Parentheses will be omitted where permissible, as e.g. in ¬φ.
Semantics
Sentences are evaluated with respect to a strong two-dimensionalist model C, v, b . Each model contains a set of worlds considered as actual c 1 , . . . , c n ∈ C and a set of worlds considered as counterfactual w 1 , . . . , w n ∈ W .
There is an ongoing debate among two-dimensionalists about the relation between the two kinds of worlds. The members of C are usually taken to be centred worlds, ordered sets that contain an individual, a world and possibly other parameters that are needed for the evaluation of indexical or context sensitive expressions. The only indexical operator that appears in my discussion of Soames's Argument 1 is the 'actually'-operator @, which is sensitive to the world contained in the world considered as actual. For the purposes of this paper, all parameters except for the contained world can therefore safely be ignored. This means that in principle, we could do with models that contain only W , but I will nonetheless rely on models with both C and W , since the semantics is clearer if the two kinds of worlds are kept apart. An exception to this rule will be made for cases in which the relevant world is shifted to the world contained in the world considered as actual. The world considered as actual will in this case be taken to replace the relevant world, which allows for a simplification of the semantics for @. Lower case letters without subscripts, e.g.
w, w , . . ., are used as variables ranging over the members of these sets. Each model contains a valuation function v ∈ {F : P → P(C × W )}, which assigns 7 Formulas that occur in prose sentences are sometimes mentioned, sometimes used. I will take the liberty of omitting the usual quotes.
to sentences in P a set of pairs of a world considered as actual and a world considered as counterfactual c, w . The second function b ∈ {F : C ×W → P(C)} 
The syntax and the semantics could easily be modified to account for the beliefs of multiple individuals by adding a set of indexed belief-operators to the language, by adding a set of individuals I to the model and by replacing b by b ∈ {F : I × C × W → P(C)}. Worlds considered as actual could then be identified with tupels of a world and an individual w, i (centered worlds). 9 Note that models as defined above lack the accessibility-relation one comes to expect in a modal semantics. This simplification is unproblematic in the context of this paper, since such a relation plays no role in Soames's argument. 10 The idea underlying the semantics for the 'actually'-operator @ is that 'actually' shifts the semantic focus to the current world considered as actual. A formally similar semantics for 'actually' is discussed in Cresswell (1990) , chapter 3. The major alternative for a twodimensionalist is a semantics that lets @ shift the world under consideration to a fixed world that is specified as a part of the model. This approach requires a different model theory, the classical exposition of which can be found in Davies and Humberstone (1980) . The approach pursued in the current paper is briefly mentioned on p. 4-5 and in notes 4 and 5 on p. 26 of Davies and Humberstone (1980) . My main argument can be made given either kind of model theory.
As explained above, the world considered as actual is allowed to take the place of a world in the semantics for @. The semantics for B captures the twodimensionalist idea that we can say truly of someone that she believes φ, if she is adequately related to φ's primary proposition. The logical connectives ∨, →, ↔ and the possibility operator ♦ are defined in the usual way. If it is clear from the context which model is being considered, the model will sometimes not be mentioned explicitly.
In the course of the paper, reference will be made to primary and secondary propositions, which correspond to the primary and secondary intensions of sentences. Based on the idea that propositions are sets of possible worlds, the
of a sentence φ are defined in the following way:
The primary proposition of a sentence φ relative to a model M is the set of There are some significant terminological differences between the characterization of strong two-dimensionalism on pp. 133-9 of Soames (2005b) 
Soames's Argument 1
Argument 1 is presented in five steps, the first four acting as premises, the last containing both the final premise and the conclusion. Since the first step merely reiterates the strong two-dimensionalist's semantics for belief ascriptions, I will focus on the remaining four steps:
Step 2 Since in every context C, the character of sentence (1a) expresses a truth with respect to C iff the character of sentence (1b) Since (b) is false, so is (a).
Step 4 Since (b) is false, so is (a).
Step 5 Since, in fact the a-sentences in steps 3 and 4 are true, the strong two-dimensionalist theses T5a and T5b are not jointly true. (Soames (2005b) have an identical primary proposition and are assigned the same secondary propositions.
Step 2 sets up the main part of the argument by drawing attention to the fact that the two belief ascriptions B(p) and B(@p) are necessarily equivalent in strong two-dimensional semantics. The main aim of Argument 1 is to exploit this fact. Soames aims to show that strong two-dimensionalists commit themselves to an intuitively false semantic verdict about certain complex sentences containing belief ascriptions embedded under a necessity operator. In the following two sections, I propose a formalization of these complex sentences that makes them apt for semantic evaluation in strong two-dimensional semantics.
The remaining steps of the argument will be discussed in section 7.
captures the contents of the two definitions, so I will not quote them here. 13 The formalization treats sentences of the form 'The actual F is the actual G' and 'Actually, the F is the G', where F and G are definite descriptions, as having the same meaning. This is unproblematic in the context of this paper. 14 More precisely: Assume that logical truth is defined in the following way: φ is a logical truth iff for every M, for c ∈ C ∈ M, for w ∈ W ∈ M, M, c, w φ. Given this definition, (B(φ) ↔ B(@φ)) is a logical truth of strong two-dimensionalism, since per definition
The (a)-and (b)-Sentences
In order to evaluate the claims made about the (a)-and (b)-sentences in Steps 3 and 4, the sentences have to be translated into the given formal language.
To do this, I will introduce the new operator T r(φ), which is read as 'Mary's belief that φ is true'. With T r, we can formalize the four sentences from Steps 3 and 4 in the following way:
Truth conditions for T r
While Soames specifies how a strong two-dimensionalist evaluates belief ascriptions, his characterization of the theory does not specify a semantics for T r. The most likely explanation for this omission is that the strong two- T r(φ) is determined by φ's primary proposition alone, the semantics has to specify which on-diagonal cell is to be considered, if T r(φ) is evaluated with respect to off-diagonal cells that do not correspond to the primary proposition.
There are two prima facie plausible ways of doing this in the given semantics.
Here is the first one:
The first part of the definiens of PT1 tells us that T r is sensitive to the ondiagonal cell that corresponds to the provided world considered as actual c. The second part specifies the requirement that there be a pair of a world considered as actual c and a world w with respect to which the belief in question is held.
Since it does not make sense to talk about the truth of a belief if that belief
is not held at all, a requirement of this kind must be part of any semantics for T r. The existential quantification is needed because there are cases in which we may want to assess the truth of a subject's belief with respect to a pair of a world considered as actual and a world, independently of whether the subject holds that belief with respect to this world pair. E.g. a strong two-dimensionalist might want to say that Johann's actually false belief that p could be true relative to a world pair where he holds the false belief that ¬p, even though p is true there. 15
The second proposal is the following:
, w |= B(φ).
While PT1 tells us to look at the on-diagonal cell that corresponds to the current world considered as actual, PT2 tells us to look at the on-diagonal cell corresponding to the world considered as actual c that contains the provided world considered as counterfactual. 16 PT1 and PT2 are the only sensible ways 15 A more compelling example can be given in a model that contains more than one individual:
Johann's actually false belief that Johann does not exist could rightly be said to be true with respect to a world considered as actual that contains a subject other than Johann, in which Johann does not exist and in which he consequently entertains no beliefs. 16 Disregarding the requirement that the relevant belief is held by the respective individual somewhere in the model, we can say that roughly, PT1 corresponds to Lewis's operator † and PT2 corresponds to Stalnaker's operator †. See Stalnaker (1978) , p. 319f and Lewis (1973) , p. 63f.
of defining truth conditions for T r based on the primary proposition.
Strong two-dimensionalism does also allow us to specify a semantics based on the secondary proposition: from immediate collapse, is to let b be such that B(p) and B(@p) are true with respect to all world pairs. Since p and @p share the same primary intension, this amounts to a single constraint on b. Based on these considerations, the model can be specified in the following way: Since the focus will be squarely on M 1 from now on, I will take advantage of a simplification of the (a)-and (b)-sentences allowed with respect to this model. 
B(p)
I will first state the truth conditions for these simplified sentences and then use M 1 -matrices to illustrate their truth values with respect to the model. This will be done once for the version of strong two-dimensional semantics with PT2 and once for the version with ST. In both cases, the requirement that the belief is being held in at least one world pair in the relevant model, which is part of the truth conditions for both semantics for T r, is trivially fulfilled with respect to M 1 . Hence, this requirement can also safely be disregarded here. The purpose of this section is to investigate whether Soames's claims from Step 3 actually hold for the two versions of strong two-dimensional semantics and whether both verify the intuitive judgement about the truth of the (a)-sentences from
Step 5. The focus will therefore be on the world considered as actual c 1 , which represents our world considered as actual in M 1 .
So why will only
Step 3 of the argument be considered? The semantics for @ and the truth-functional definition of the material conditional → together guarantee the truth of (4a) and (4b) with respect to any world considered as actual in which p is true. As p is true with respect to c 1 , both sentences are necessarily true with respect to c 1 , so Soames's second claim from Step 4 is false. This is the case with PT2 and with ST, which means that Step 4
is completely ineffective as a component of an argument against strong twodimensional semantics as understood in this paper. Hence only Step 3 needs to be considered. A compact overview of the results of the following subsections can be found in section 8.
7.1
Step 3 
PT2: Summary
Given PT2, (3a*) and (3b*) have the same truth values with respect to both c 1 and c 2 . This means that Soames's first claim is true in M 1 concerning this variant of strong two-dimensional semantics. His second claim is true with respect to c 1 , but false with respect to c 2 . Given our focus on c 1 , the second claim can also be considered true with respect to M 1 .
7.2
ST: Summary
The first claim from
Step 3 does not hold in M 1 : Given strong two-dimensional semantics with ST, (3a*) and (3b*) differ in truth value with respect to c 1 . As a consequence, the second claim does also not hold, since (3a*) is true, (3b*)
false with respect to c 1 .
Step 5
As was noted earlier, Step 5 contains both the last premise of Argument 1 and its conclusion. The last premise claims that (3a) is true. This is the intuitive semantic judgement that strong two-dimensionalists are supposedly unable to account for. But the semantic evaluations show that strong twodimensional semantics with ST can account for the intuitive judgement for (3a*) with respect to M 1 . Strong two-dimensional semantics with PT2 on the other hand renders (3a*) false with respect to the same model. A strong twodimensionalist who wants to accommodate the semantic intuition that the (a)-sentences are true is therefore well advised to choose ST over PT2. Concerning the conclusion of the argument, a very similar point can be made. Given ST, the two crucial claims made in Step 3 are both rendered false in the model under consideration. Hence, as a strong two-dimensionalist, one should adopt ST rather than PT2, since given ST, Argument 1 has a false premise and is therefore unsound.
PT2 vs ST
The following table illustrates the results from the previous section: Step 3 There are three lesson to be drawn from the given analysis of Soames's Argument 1. First, if PT2 was the only feasible semantics for T r, the argument (sans Step 4) would be effective. Second, strong two-dimensionalists who adopt ST can, contrary to Soames's claim, account for the semantic intuition that the (a)-sentences are true. Third, with ST in place, the strong two-dimensionalist's semantics fails to conform to the crucial assumptions made for the purpose of a reductio ad absurdum in Argument 1's premises, so the threat of the argument is completely neutralised. These seem good reasons to draw the conclusion that strong two-dimensionalists should adopt ST. The given argument however also offers a clear perspective to their adversaries: A convincing argument against ST would suffice to reinstate Argument 1. In the last section of this paper, I
will discuss one important candidate for such an argument.
Unlike PT2, ST semantically detaches T r from the primary intension and hence from B. A strong two-dimensionalist who adopts ST is committed to the view that the question of whether one holds a certain belief is settled by one's relation to the relevant primary proposition, while the question of whether what one believes is true is settled by the relevant secondary proposition. This means that strong two-dimensional semantics with ST violates a certain metaphysical constraint on semantic theories, namely the constraint that in cases where a subject's belief is said to be true, there should be one unique proposition that plays both the role of the truth bearer and provides the object of the belief.
As a consequence, a strong two-dimensionalist prima facie has to deny that a sentence like 'There is something such that Mary believes it and it is true.' can express a truth. This gives us the following argument against ST: ST violates the metaphysical constraint. The metaphysical constraint must be met by any adequate semantic theory. Therefore, strong two-dimensionalists cannot adopt ST. I take this to be a valid argument. If the argument is also sound, the proposed strong two-dimensionalist reply to Argument 1 is blocked. In this section, I will briefly discuss three different responses to this argument against
ST. 21
The first response denies the first premise and attempts to explain away the conflict between the semantic theory and the metaphysical constraint. To do this, the quantifier in a sentence like 'There is something such that Mary believes it and it is true.' is given a non-objectual reading. This reading allows the friend of ST to account for the possible truth of this sentence without incurring ontological commitment to one unique proposition that is quantified over. 22 It is then claimed that this suffices to meet the metaphysical constraint.
21 From here on, strong two-dimensionalism will be taken to include ST, unless explicitly stated otherwise. A general problem I see with this strategy is that the metaphysical constraint is, if at all, only met on the surface. The strategy does not ensure that the same entity is responsible both for the truth of Mary's having a belief and the truth of her belief, since it does not deal with such ontological issues at all.
The second strategy also denies the first premise. It relies on an equivalent reformulation of strong two-dimensional semantics in which both B and T r operate on the same kind of semantic entity, the compound proposition.
be that both the primary and the relevant secondary proposition of a sentence contribute to the truth-conditions for B. This is not the case in the proposed reformulation of strong two-dimensional semantics. Secondary propositions are part of the compound proposition that B operates on, but they have no bearing on the operator's truth-conditions. Hence, the reformulation does not fall under Soames's definition of hybrid two-dimensionalism. This second strategy seems more promising than the first one: The reformulation of the semantics both incorporates ST and conforms to the metaphysical constraint by relying on compound propositions as the basic semantic entities. 26
The third strategy is to deny the second premise and to consequently reject the metaphysical constraint. This move is less radical than it might seem.
Strong two-dimensionalists have to reject a close relative of the constraint in any case, since their semantics for B and for operate on two different kinds of propositions. One could even argue that rejecting the metaphysical constraint allows them to tie their semantics for T r closer to their semantics for , thereby strengthening an intuitive link between necessity and the truth of beliefs. The crucial question about this approach is, which impact the denial of the constraint has concerning the adequacy of a semantic theory. This is a complex question that cannot be fully addressed here. In the following, I will only give a quick sketch of a general view of semantics that could be used to vindicate a strong two-dimensionalist's choice to deny the metaphysical constraint. On this view, the purpose of semantic theories is to provide precise models of certain aspects of meaning that adequately reflect our linguistic practice. In the standard case, the modelled aspect of meaning are the truth conditions for the sentences of our language. Plausibly, the most important criterion for the adequacy of a semantic theory of this kind is that the truth values assigned by it conform to our linguistic practice. 27 Whether a semantic theory makes use of one or multiple kinds of propositions in order to meet this criterion is then only of secondary interest. A semantic theory that 26 Note that the second strategy could rightly be called ad hoc, if it turned out that the only motivation for the proposed reformulation was its utility for the sketched response to the argument against ST. 27 Lewis could be read as advocating a view like this. See Lewis (1986) , ch. 1.2, pp. 40-1. makes use of multiple propositions might have the vice of not being ontologically parsimonious, but this theory-aesthetic disadvantage would carry no or only minimal weight concerning the overall adequacy of the theory. Unless it is shown that strong two-dimensional semantics with ST fails to deliver truth conditions that adequately reflect our linguistic practice, its proponents could hence justify rejecting the metaphysical constraint by adopting the sketched general view of semantics. 28 
